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Inducers and Authorisers: A Comparison of the US Supreme Court’s 
Grokster decision and the Australian Federal Court’s KaZaa ruling 
 




On 27 June 2005, the US Supreme Court announced its much-awaited decision in 
MGM Studios, Inc v Grokster Ltd.1 A few months after this, the Federal Court of 
Australia handed down its decision at first instance in relation to parallel litigation in 
that country concerning the KaZaa file sharing system.  Both decisions repay careful 
consideration of the way in which the respective courts have addressed the 
relationship between the protection of authors’ rights and the advent of new 
technologies, particularly in relation to peer-to-peer networks.  
 
In the Grokster case, songwriters, record producers and motion picture producers 
alleged that two popular ‘file-sharing’ networks, Grokster and Streamcast (dba 
Morpheus) should be held liable for facilitating the commission of massive amounts 
of copyright infringement by the end-users who employed the defendants’ peer-to-
peer (P2P) software to copy and redistribute films and sound recordings to each 
others’ hard drives.  The court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of summary 
judgment for defendants, holding that the technology entrepreneurs could be held 
liable for ‘actively inducing’ the end-users’ acts of infringement. A similar decision 
was reached in Australia with respect to the KaZaa software, albeit in this proceeding 
the court had the advantage of much greater factual material as to the operation of the 
KaZaa system than did the US Supreme Court in Grokster.  Nonetheless, both cases 
illustrate the difficulties that arise as consumer-wielded digital media increasingly 
supplant the traditional intermediaries who made copyrighted works available to the 
public (and who traditionally were the targets of copyright enforcement) and as courts 
struggle to balance meaningful protection for works of authorship against the progress 
of technological innovation.  For some, the weakening of copyright control is the 
necessary price to pay for technological advancement.2  For others, authors’ ability to 
maintain exclusive rights remains a cornerstone of any copyright system as it adapts 
to accommodate new modes of exploitation.3 
 
 Grokster is the latest, and most important, in a series of US decisions to address that 
balance by articulating the liability of an enterprise which does not itself commit 
copyright infringement, but instead makes it possible for others to infringe.  To 
appreciate the Supreme Court’s analysis, it helps to set the case in both domestic and 
                                                 
* Morton L Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University School of 
Law.  Many thanks to Sverker Högberg, Columbia Law School class of 2006, and to Kevin Burdette, 
Columbia Law School class of 2007. 
** Professor of Law, University of Melbourne. 
1 125 S Ct 2764 (2005). 
2 See eg ibid, at 2793 (Breyer J concurring); L Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology 
and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity, Penguin Books, New York, 2004. 
3 See eg S Dogan, ‘Code Versus the Common Law’ (2003) 2 Journal of Telecommunications & High 
Technology Law 73; J C Ginsburg, ‘Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination’ 
(2001) 101 Columbia Law Review 1613.  
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international doctrinal context.  Because unauthorised P2P distribution of copyrighted 
works extends well beyond the US, copyright owners have pursued legal actions in 
other countries, including the Netherlands4 and Australia.5  While the Australian case 
still awaits full appellate consideration, it provides a useful example of how another 
common law jurisdiction (Australia) analyses the liability of those who provide goods 
or services to facilitate infringement.  In this regard, it is also useful to consider what 
obligations, if any, exist at the international level with respect to the liability of 
infringement-facilitators.  We will conclude with some (perhaps foolhardy) forecasts 
for the post-Grokster/KaZaa future of copyright enforcement. 
 
Liability in the US for facilitating copyright infringement 
 
Copyright infringement is a tort.6  So is knowingly enabling or inciting another to 
infringe.  Decisions dating back several decades recognise that one who supplies the 
means to infringe and knows of the use to which the means will be put (or turns a 
blind eye) can be held liable for contributory infringement.7  In the early cases, 
however, the relationship between the supplier and the user of the means was 
sufficiently close, that there could be little doubt of either the knowledge or the nexus 
between the means and the infringement.8  For example, in the ‘make-a-tape’ case, a 
record shop rented sound recordings to customers who would also purchase a blank 
tape and then use a recording machine on the store premises to copy the rented 
recording onto the blank tape.9  The store owner’s knowledge of the likely use of the 
blank tape was patent.  When, however, the infringement-facilitating device leaves the 
direct control of the facilitator, so that he or she no longer knows in fact what the 
customers are up to, contributory infringement may be more difficult to establish.  
That, in essence, was the copyright owners’ problem in the ‘Betamax’ case.10  Sony, 
the distributor of the video tape recorder, could well anticipate that consumers would 
use the record function to copy protected programs, but once the device was out of the 
manufacturer’s hands, it could neither know precisely what the end users were doing, 
nor limit their use to permissible copying. 
 
In absolving Sony of liability, the US Supreme Court added a gloss to the prior 
standard: one who distributes an infringement-enabling device will not be liable for 
the ensuing infringements if the device is ‘widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable 
                                                 
4 Vereniging Buma, Stichting Stemra v KaZaa BV, Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad), 
decision of 19 December 2003, AN7253 Case no: C02/186HR. 
5 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 1242. 
6 See Latman and Tager, ‘Innocent Infringement of Copyright’, 2 Studies on Copyright 139 (Fisher 
memorial edition 1963). 
7 See generally Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright Aspen Publishers, New York, 3rd ed, 2005, 
para 8.1 (citing cases). 
8 See ibid (advancing the general proposition that ‘the closer the defendant’s acts are to the infringing 
activity, the stronger will be the inference that the defendant knew of the activity’). 
9 Elektra Records Co v Gem Electronic Distributors, Inc, 360 F Supp 821 (EDNY 1973).  See also 
RCA Records v A;-Fast Systems, Inc, 594 F Supp 335 (SDNY 1984) (defendant’s employees used 
‘Rezound’ cassette recorder to make copies of sound recordings on customers’ request); A&M Records 
v General Audio Video Cassettes, 948 F Supp 1449 (CD Cal 1996) (sale of custom-length blank tape 
timed to correspond to particular sound recordings). 
10 Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, 464 US 417 (1984). 
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purposes.  Indeed it need merely be capable of substantial non-infringing use’.11  This 
is so even though the distributor was aware that at least some of the use to which the 
device would be put would be infringing.  The court then held that time-shifting 
(recording for subsequent viewing and then erasure) of free broadcast television 
programs was a fair use.12  On the record in the case, the ‘primary use’ of the VTR 
was for time-shifting.13  A use held to be non-infringing thus predominated and 
certainly met the ‘substantial’ standard. 
 
The Sony ‘substantial non-infringing use’ standard did not again come into play with 
respect to mass-market means of copying until the Napster controversy.14  There, an 
online peer-to-peer music ‘sharing’ service maintained a central database that allowed 
end users to find other users currently online and to copy MP3 files from their hard 
drives.  Napster invoked the Sony standard, asserting that not all the files were copied 
without authorisation.  Napster also asserted that P2P architecture could in the future 
spawn more non-infringing uses.  The Ninth Circuit agreed that Sony required taking 
into account the service’s capacity for future lawful use but nonetheless held Napster 
a contributory infringer.  In yet another gloss on the standard of liability, the Napster 
court held that courts should inquire into non-infringing uses when the distributor of 
the device lacks actual knowledge of and control over specific infringements.  Where, 
however, it is possible to segregate and prevent infringing uses, it is not appropriate to 
exculpate the entire system by virtue of its capacity for non-infringing uses.  In other 
words, the consequences to technology of enforcing copyright rules were different in 
Sony and in Napster.  Sony presented the court with an all-or-nothing challenge: either 
the device would be enjoined, frustrating legitimate uses, or no liability would attach, 
despite the infringements the device enabled.  In Napster, by contrast, the service 
could disable infringing uses by blocking access to listings of protected files, while 
allowing permissible uses to continue.  Napster thus transformed Sony into an inquiry 
into knowledge of and ability to prevent specific infringements.15 
 
Of course, Napster set out the instructions for its own demise: if Napster was liable 
because it could maintain control over its users’ activities, then the next device or 
service would make sure to make it difficult if not impossible for the service to 
exercise control.16  So were born KaZaa, and its US licensees, Grokster and 
Morpheus.  Unlike Napster, these services had no centralised directory: they dispersed 
information about file location across computer ‘nodes’ around the world.  Users 
could find each other, but the services disclaimed the ability to prevent infringements 
as they were occurring.  Although it recognised that Grokster and Morpheus had 
intentionally built their systems to defeat copyright enforcement, the Ninth Circuit 
held that, without the ability to prevent specific infringements, the services could not 
                                                 
11 464 US at 442 
12 Ibid, at 447–56. 
13 Ibid, at 493 (Blackmun J dissenting). 
14 A&M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc 239 F 3d 1004 (9th Cir 2001).  But see Vault v Quaid Software, 
874 F 2d 255 (5th Cir 1988) (distributor of program designed to circumvent software copyright 
protection held not liable for contributory infringement because program could be used for non-
infringing purpose of making back up copies authorised by 17 USC § 117). 
15 For a criticism of the Ninth Circuit’s approach, see Goldstein, above n 7, at § 8.1.2. 
16 See eg F Von Lohmann, ‘IAAL:  Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Copyright Law after Napster’ (2001) 
available at <http://www.gtamarketing.com/P2Panalyst/VonLohmann-article.html>. 
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be liable.17  The court scarcely considered whether the services enabled substantial 
non-infringing use; it acknowledged that 90% of the uses were infringing, but 
observed in footnote that 10% could be substantial, particularly when the 10% 
referenced many millions of uses.  (That the other 90% would be even more extensive 
seems not to have troubled the court.)18 
 
A unanimous US Supreme Court reversed.  It held that the Ninth Circuit had 
misapplied the Sony standard, or, more accurately, that the Ninth Circuit did not 
appreciate that the Sony standard does not even come into play when the defendant is 
‘actively inducing’ copyright infringement.  That is, a device might well be capable of 
substantial non-infringing uses.  But if it can be shown that the distributor intended 
users to employ the device in order to infringe copyright, then the distributor will be 
liable as a matter of basic tort principles.  In this light, Sony was a case articulating a 
standard for assessing liability when it cannot be shown that the device distributor 
sought to foster infringement.  But if the defendant has actively induced infringement, 
there is no need to revisit the Sony standard in order to clarify what ‘substantial non-
infringing use’ actually means.  
 
The court set out three elements probative of intent to induce infringement: (1) the 
defendant promoted the infringement-enabling virtues of its device; (2) the defendant 
failed to filter out infringing uses; (3) defendant’s business plan depended on a high 
volume of infringement.  In Grokster’s case, all three elements were easily 
demonstrated.  Grokster had sent out emails extolling P2P copying, and it had 
‘aim[ed] to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement, the market 
comprising former Napster users.’19  Grokster not only declined to devise its own 
filters; it blocked third-party filters.  And Grokster’s business plan depended on 
advertising, whose rates would turn on the volume of users encountering the ads.  The 
more Grokster could attract visitors, the better for its business, and the prospect of 
free music attracts more visitors than paid music.  Taken together, these factors 
demonstrated a clear intention to foster infringement.  As the court declared: ‘The 
unlawful objective is unmistakable.’20  
 
Of course, inducement to infringe is actionable only if infringements in fact occur.  
Because the liability derives from primary infringing conduct, bad intent must join 
with unlawful end user acts.  Thus, for example, distributing a copying device 
together with an exhortation to use the device to engage in massive unauthorised 
copying does not give rise to liability if no one in fact so uses it.  In Grokster, 
however, end user infringement was never in doubt; plaintiffs’ studies showed that 
90% of the works copied were copyrighted,21 and even the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that the ‘Copyright Owners assert, without serious contest by the 
                                                 
17 MGM Studios, Inc v Grokster Ltd, 380 F 3d 1154 at 1165–66 (9th Cir 2004) rev’d 125 S Ct 2764 
(2005). 
18 380 F3d at 1162 n 10. 
19 125 S Ct at 2781.  See also S Högberg, ‘Note, The Judicial Search For Intent-Based Doctrines Of 
Secondary Liability In Copyright Law’ (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review (forthcoming) (discussing 
the post-Grokster dangers of targeting a ‘risky demographic’). 
20 125 S Ct at 2782. 
21 Ibid, at 2772, 2778. 
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Software Distributors, that the vast majority of the files are exchanged illegally in 
violation of copyright law.’22  The Supreme Court thus could exclaim: ‘The probable 
scope of copyright infringement is staggering.’23 
 
Having ruled that bad intent, if proved, sufficed to establish liability for infringements 
thus induced, the full court declined to analyse what the standard for contributory 
infringement would be when intent to foster infringement cannot be shown.  The full 
court opinion provided some clues, however, when it stressed that certain of the three 
indicia of intent could not, in isolation, establish inducement, because basing liability 
solely on defendant’s business plan or solely on the design of its product would be 
inconsistent with Sony.24  But the court assiduously declined to offer further guidance 
on the meaning of ‘substantial non-infringing use.’ 
 
Two concurring opinions, each signed by three justices, ventured onto that terrain, 
advancing opposing analyses.  For Ginsburg J, Sony requires that copyright protection 
be ‘effective – not merely symbolic’.25  Where the overwhelming use of the device is 
to infringe, to reject the distributor’s liability would reduce copyright protection to the 
merely symbolic.  The three justices also stressed factual differences between the uses 
of the ‘Betamax’ and the activities of Grokster and Streamcast.  In Sony, the 
‘timeshifting’ that the court deemed fair use was in fact the primary use of the video 
tape recorder at the time.  By contrast, the copies the Grokster and Streamcast users 
made were not ruled fair uses, and the defendants made no showing of significant 
actual non-infringing uses.  The concurring opinion chided the Ninth Circuit for its 
failure to ‘distinguish between uses of Grokster’s and StreamCast’s software products 
(which this case is about) and uses of peer-to-peer technology generally (which this 
case is not about)’;26 the evidence of non-infringing use presented by the defendants, 
and credited by the Ninth Circuit, addressed the general benefits of P2P and not the 
particular application of P2P by Grokster and Streamcast. 
 
Failure to distinguish between peer-to-peer in general and the particular exploitation 
made of that technology by Grokster and Streamcast characterises the other 
concurring opinion by Breyer J, signed as well by Stevens and O’Connor JJ, who had 
authored or signed the majority opinion in Sony.  This opinion urged a broad 
interpretation of Sony in order to provide security to technology entrepreneurs against 
attacks by copyright owners allegedly harmed by the distribution of devices that 
enable end users to make unauthorised uses of works of authorship.  For these 
justices, the phrase ‘capable of substantial non-infringing use’ must be understood to 
excuse the distributor of a device whose lawful use is as low as 10%, especially if 
non-infringing uses might develop in the future.  Moreover, this concurrence stressed, 
the potential for non-infringing use should be assessed with respect to devices ‘of this 
type’, and not specifically in relation to the defendant’s device.  Breyer J thus could 
assert that it did not matter that Grokster ‘may not want to develop these other non-
infringing uses.  But Sony's standard seeks to protect not the Groksters of this world 
                                                 
22 380 F 3d at 1160. 
23 125 S Ct at 2772. 
24 Ibid, at 2781–82 and n 12. 
25 Ibid, at 2783 (Ginsburg J concurring).  Rehnquist CJ and Kennedy J joined this concurrence. 
26 Ibid, at 2786. 
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(which in any event may well be liable under today’s holding), but the development 
of technology more generally’.27 
 
Breyer J emphasised four benefits to the Sony doctrine (as understood by the three 
concurring justices): The rule is clear; it is ‘strongly technology protecting’; it is 
forward-looking; and it does not require judges to evaluate the technology at issue.28  
The opinion does not hide its bias in favour of technological development: in 
weighing the disadvantages inflicted on technology against the advantages to authors 
and copyright owners that would flow from a stricter interpretation of Sony such as 
that pressed by the Ginsburg concurrence, Breyer J’s opinion does not allude to the 
interests of creativity, but to ‘greater revenue security for copyright holders’.29  In this 
perspective, the only creators who count appear to be the technology innovators, here 
confronted with the anonymous and oppressive financial interests of the ‘copyright 
holders.’  The opinion goes farther, declaring that in any event that ‘the law 
disfavours equating the two different kinds of gain [(copyright)] and loss 
[(technology)]; rather, it leans in favour of protecting technology’.30  This striking 
affirmation is based neither on the text of 1976 Copyright Act nor in the Constitution.  
Its principal foundation is the Sony decision, which, as we have seen, can be 
understood in several different ways.31 
 
But perhaps the disagreement over the Sony standard will not in fact matter very much 
because the Grokster inducement standard may displace inquiries into the 
substantiality of non-infringing uses.  Speculation is hazardous, but one might predict 
that, where a device facilitates infringement on a massive scale, its distributor will 
likely be found to have intended that result.  Where the infringement the device 
enables is relatively modest in scale, inducement will not be found, but neither will 
the Sony threshold for liability be held to have been crossed, whatever its height.  In 
other words, ‘inducement’ and ‘substantial non-infringing use’ will become legal 
conclusions, separating the Sony (good technology) sheep from the Grokster (evil 
entrepreneur) goats. 
 
The following analysis supports the speculation.  Suppose in each of the ensuing 
cases, the device made available to the public enables a very high volume of 
infringement. 
 
                                                 
27 Ibid, at 2790 (Breyer J concurring). 
28 Ibid, at 2791–92. 
29 Ibid, at 2793. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Breyer J’s declaration proposes a starker opposition than the court’s earlier dictum in Twentieth 
Century Music Corp v Aiken, 422 US 151 at 156 (1975) (‘The limited scope of the copyright holder’s 
statutory monopoly … reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is 
to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting 
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.  … When technological change has 
rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic 
purpose.’).  The Aiken decision did not, however, concern new technologies; the question there was 
whether a small commercial establishment’s receipt of radio programming by means of a home style 
receiving device was a ‘performance’ of the broadcast. 
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Case 1: The distributor, culture-wants-to-be-free.com, promotes the infringement-
facilitating features of its device or service, and does not filter out infringing uses.  
But it has no business plan because it does not seek revenues; rather it wishes to 
liberate content from copyright’s clutches. 
 
Although one of the three Grokster elements is missing, this still seems like a 
straightforward case of ‘inducement’, and, assuming the device is used as intended, 
liability would be found. 
 
Case 2: The distributor, culture-for-me.com, neither promotes infringement, nor filters 
infringements out; its business plan requires a high volume of traffic to the site.  
Bloggers on the unaffiliated culture-wants-to-be-free.com site identify and promote 
the infringement-facilitating features of culture-for-me.com’s device or service. 
 
The most probative Grokster element – advertising – seems absent here.  If culture-
for-me.com merely benefits from, but is not in league with, culture-wants-to-be-
free.com, then the question becomes whether failure to filter, plus an infringement-
dependent business plan, suffice to establish inducement.  Grokster tells us that each 
of these two in isolation will not demonstrate inducement, but neither did Grokster 
explicitly require all three elements to be present before inducement could be found.  
Moreover, as the Australian Federal Court in its KaZaa case recognised,32 the 
distributor of a device or service is not likely to filter if to do so would reduce its 
economic benefit.  In other words, the two go hand in hand.  Other Grokster elements 
prove interdependent as well: a site that does filter is not likely to advertise an ability 
to facilitate infringement if it has in fact hampered that capacity.  A site that does 
filter, moreover, will probably not be engendering massive infringement. 
 
To determine whether advertising is the sine qua non of inducement, one might 
consider whether, once it is shown that the distributor promoted infringing uses of the 
device, it necessarily follows that inducement will be found.  The Sony case itself 
suggests not.  As Jessica Litman has convincingly recounted, there was considerable 
evidence that could have led to characterising the Sony Corporation of America as 
an ‘inducer’.  Sony published advertisements encouraging consumers to build 
libraries of recorded television programming.33  One advertisement depicted a 
television set next to a large bookcase fully stocked with hand-labelled boxes of 
Betamax tapes and congratulated consumers on their creation of a home tape library 
of programs.  But, despite this evidence of incitement to unauthorised copying – and 
retention – of protected works, the court did not find Sony liable.  As Litman’s study 
also shows, a bare majority of the court was unlikely to find Sony liable on any 
theory, convinced as Stevens J and his allies were that the primary consumer conduct 
should not be deemed wrongful.  But recall that most of that conduct was in 
connection with an activity – time-shifting – that the majority held non-infringing.  In 
other words, the Sony Corporation may have been proposing that consumers engage 
in an activity – librarying – whose characterisation as a fair use was very doubtful, but 
                                                 
32 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 1242. 
33 See J Litman, ‘The Story of Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios: Mary Poppins Meets the 
Boston Strangler’ in J Ginsburg and R Dreyfuss (eds), Intellectual Property Stories, Foundation Press, 
New York, 2005, p358 at pp. 360–61. 
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most consumers in fact used the Betamax for a purpose the court deemed ‘fair’.  This 
suggests that incitement unaccompanied by substantial infringements does not give 
rise to liability. 
 
If promotion standing alone does not necessarily amount to inducement, perhaps it is 
also true that non-filtering together with infringement-dependent business plans can 
so add up.  With or without advertising, the economy of the operation depends on 
infringement.  If that is so, it is difficult to see how the entrepreneur could not have 
intended to foster infringement.34  And Grokster tells us that where there is (realised) 
intent, there will be liability. 
 
Does this prove too much?  Grokster may instruct that technology entrepreneurs 
should not draw their start-up capital from other people’s copyrights.35  Pressing 
copyright owners into service as the principal (uncompensated) investors in a new 
technology seems rather problematic.  But what if there are other investors?  That is, 
let’s assume that lawful uses account for some portion of the device or service’s 
appeal, so that the service could start up thanks to the revenues derived from the 
lawful uses, although input from other people’s copyrights may remain necessary to 
profitability.  The Grokster goats are those technologists whose business plans would 
not exist but for the infringements they enable.  What barnyard characterisation fits 
those whose business plans, albeit copyright-parasitic, contemplate mixing infringing 
and non-infringing sources of revenue?  If we take Grokster’s treatment of the role of 
intent literally, then the partial foundation of the business plan (and the concomitant 
device design) on non-infringing uses should not matter; the entrepreneur still intends 
to foster some infringement.36  Liability, however, may turn on how much 
infringement, for we have posited that Grokster will supply the rule when the actual 
                                                 
34 Tim Wu has suggested that, while failure to filter may not of itself prove bad intent, the entrepreneur 
who does filter may defeat inferences of intent to induce infringement.  Filtering thus may afford a 
‘safe harbor’ from future inducement claims.  See T Wu, ‘The Copyright Paradox: Understanding 
Grokster’ (2005) Supreme Court Review (forthcoming), available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=828784>.  An early post-Grokster decision 
appears to bear this out, see Monotype Imaging v Bitstream, 376 F Supp 2d 877, 888-89 (ND Ill 2005) 
(finding no inducement because, inter alia, defendant submitted evidence that it had taken steps to 
avoid the infringing use of its compatible type fonts.  The court also found that ‘unlike in Grokster, 
there is no evidence in the record to show that Bitstream’s business was benefited by increasing the 
number of infringing uses of [its product]’. 
35 See Oral Argument Transcript at 36, MGM Studios, Inc v Grokster Ltd, 125 S Ct 2764 (2005) (No 
04-480), available at <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-
480.pdf>. 
‘Kennedy J: -- but what you have -- what you want to do is to say that unlawfully expropriated 
property can be used by the owner of the instrumentality as part of the startup capital for his product. 
Mr Taranto: I -- well – 
Kennedy J: And I -- just from an economic standpoint and a legal standpoint, that sounds wrong to 
me.’ 
36 A more charitable characterisation might state that the non filtering entrepreneur does not seek to 
encourage infringement, but has concluded that the cost of designing the product to avoid 
infringements exceeds the returns expected from the product’s sale.  It would follow that if Grokster 
points toward an obligation to filter, some number of products will not be made or commercialised.  
See eg M D Brown, O Armon, L Ploeger and M Traynor, ‘Secondary Liability for Inducing Copyright 
Infringement After MGM v Grokster: Infringement-Prevention and Product Design’ (2005) 9 Journal 
of Internet Law 1.   
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or potential volume of infringement is ‘staggering’.  Short of that (but how much 
short of that remains uncertain), the Sony standard reappears with (as we have 
posited) the result that the challenged technology will be deemed lawful.37 
 
If this prediction is incorrect, then we can expect further development of the Sony 
standard for exculpatory non-infringing use.  In the absence of intent to induce 
infringement, will even trivial non-infringing use suffice to insulate the technology 
entrepreneur so long as the technology in the abstract is capable of future non-
infringing use?  Or will any device or service primarily used to infringe run afoul of 
the standard?  Perhaps a glance at the analysis in a related jurisdiction might clarify 
the liability of infringement facilitators.  The decision of the Federal Court of 
Australia in Universal Music v Sharman Networking addressed the liability of the 
KaZaa network for ‘authorising’ infringements, in violation of the Australian 
Copyright Act. 
 
Liability under Australian law for facilitating infringement 
 
Liability for Grokster-type activities in Australia potentially falls under several heads: 
while the net result may be similar to that under US law, the labels are different and 
there are some differences in emphasis.  Thus, an Australian plaintiff will seek to 
establish liability by reference to (a) the statutory concept of ‘authorisation’ of 
infringement of copyright, and (b) common law principles governing joint tortfeasors.  




The Copyright Act 1968 deals with the exclusive rights of copyright owners and 
infringement of those rights in separate provisions. In the case of works (‘literary, 
dramatic, musical and artistic’), the exclusive rights to do certain ‘acts’ are 
enumerated in s 31(1) and include the exclusive right to reproduce the work in a 
material form, to publish it, to perform it in public, communicate it to the public, and 
adapt it.  Separate, and more limited, exclusive rights are conferred on other subject-
matter, such as sound recordings (s 85), films (s 86), broadcasts (s 87) and published 
editions (s 88).  These rights, in turn, are infringed by anyone ‘who, not being the 
owner of the copyright, and without the license of the owner of the copyright, does in 
Australia or authorises the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright’ 
(ss 36(1) and 101(1)).   
 
Australian copyright law therefore envisages that infringement of the exclusive rights 
of a copyright in works or other subject matter may occur in one of two ways: 
directly, through the hands of the infringer, or indirectly, through the act of 
                                                 
37 If the sheep are to be divided from the goats based on volume of infringement, this poses challenges 
for the timing of any lawsuit.  If suit is brought too soon, the record on actual use may not be 
sufficiently established.  But if copyright owners wait to see how the device or service is used in fact, it 
may become difficult to dislodge; ‘fair use’ may reduce to a synonym for ‘fait accompli’.  Cf D G 
Baird, ‘Changing Technology and Unchanging Doctrine: Sony Corp v Universal Studios (1984) 
Supreme Court Review 237 at 249 (making a similar observation regarding the timing of the Betamax 
case). 
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authorising another party (the direct infringer) to commit the infringing act.  
‘Authorisation’ is a separate species or form of infringement, which is distinct from 
general law principles of joint tortfeasorship and vicarious liability.38  While the latter 
may still have a role to play (see below), it seems that the concept of ‘authorisation’ 
was first introduced into Australian39 (and UK40) copyright laws as a means of filling 
gaps that were left by the application of those principles.41  A rich body of case law, 
both Australian and English, has developed and refined the concept of ‘authorisation’ 
as follows. 
 
Although liability for authorising infringements of copyright is distinct from direct 
liability for infringement, in many cases it may be possible to establish direct liability 
by invoking the doctrine of vicarious liability in the case of employees or agents 
acting on behalf of principals.42  ‘Authorisation’, however, extends beyond the 
authority given to an agent, and has been interpreted by courts in both Australia and 
the UK as having its ordinary dictionary sense of ‘sanction, approve and 
countenance’.43  It seems clear that this includes the specific grant of permission to do 
the act in question, but it may also be possible to imply such permission from the 
surrounding circumstances.44  In each instance, however, it will be a question of fact 
as to what is the correct inference to be drawn from the conduct of the defendant.  
Thus, in Falcon v Famous Players Film Co Ltd,45 a person who had entered a hiring 
agreement with the proprietor of a picture theatre, purporting to let the right to exhibit 
a film, was held to have authorised its exhibition in public.46  Likewise, in Wilden 
Pump & Engineering Co v Fusfeld,47 the placing of an order for the manufacture of 
articles which infringed the copyright in certain drawings was held to constitute an 
authorisation of these infringing acts.  These are probably fairly clear instances of 
‘authorisation’, but the factual circumstances in which this may arise are many and 
various, meaning that 
 
…any attempt to prescribe beforehand ready-made tests for determining on which 
side of the line a particular case will fall, would seem doomed to failure. In the end 
                                                 
38 Although the US Copyright Act also sets out the author’s exclusive rights as ‘to do or to authorise,’ 
see 17 USC sec 106, US courts have not given independent content to the authorisation prong.  See eg 
Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 US 417 at 435–36 (1984) (no discussion of 
statutory text ‘to do or to authorise,’ but discussing Kalem v Harper Bros, 222 US 55 (1911) in which 
the court found ‘authorisation’ of infringing public performances of unlicensed film adaptation of novel 
Ben Hur). 
39 Copyright Act 1905 (Cth) s 13(1). 
40 Copyright Act 1911 (UK) s 1(1). 
41 See the discussion by Gummow J in WEA  Int v Hanimex Corporation Ltd (1987) 10 IPR 349 at 
359ff. 
42 See, for example, Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Miles [1965] NSWR 405. 
43 Falcon v Famous Players Film Co Ltd 1926] 2 KB 474 (CA) and University of New South Wales v 
Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1. 
44 University of New South Wales v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1 at 21 (Jacobs J) and see Gibbs J at 
12, citing City of Adelaide v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 481 at 504.  
See also Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] 1 KB 1 at 9 (Bankes 
LJ). 
45 Falcon v Famous Players Film Co Ltd [1926] 2 KB 474 (CA). 
46 See also Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] 1 KB 1 (Bankes LJ) 
47 (1985) 8 IPR 250 at 279–280 (Ch, Whitford J). 
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the matter must in each case depend on a careful examination of all the relevant 
facts.48 
 
Courts, both in Australia and the UK, have also emphasised the need for there to be 
some ability, on the part of the alleged authoriser, to control or prevent the infringing 
act.  The paradigm instance of this is provided by UNSW v Moorhouse49 where the 
infringing copies were made on a photocopying machine situated within the premises 
of a university library and where the librarian had placed no apparent controls on 
whom might use the machine.  At the other end of the spectrum, where there was no 
liability for authorisation, is WEA International Inc v Hanimex Corporation Ltd,50 
where the respondent had advertised its tapes for sale in such a way as to provide an 
invitation to purchasers to copy protected sound recordings, but there was no evidence 
of any connection or control between the respondent and any unauthorised copies that 
were made.  To similar effect is CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics 
plc,51 where the House of Lords held that the manufacturers of twin-deck tape-
recording machines which enabled the copying of one tape onto another were not 
thereby authorising any acts of infringing reproduction that might occur because 
Amstrad had no control over the use of these machines once they were sold to 
consumers.  In the same way, in RCA Corp v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd,52 the writing 
of a newspaper article that pointed to the ease with which rock music could be taped 
from the (then) new FM broadcasts was not an authorisation of any infringement that 
may have occurred – it was necessary for there to be some link or connection, 
‘however tenuous’, between the authoriser and the infringer.53  A corollary, or 
perhaps more correctly, a preliminary requirement, to this is that there must be some 
actual evidence that infringements have occurred: mere invitations or encouragements 
issued to all and sundry will not suffice.  
 
No specific mental element for authorisation is indicated in the legislation.  From the 
case law, however, it seems that, while the actual acts of infringement may be 
committed unintentionally, some degree of knowledge is necessary for the purposes 
of establishing that there has been an authorisation of such acts.  Thus, in Australasian 
Performing Right Association Ltd v Jain,54 the full Federal Court said:55 
 
…the word ‘authorise’ connotes a mental element and it could not be inferred that a 
person had, by mere inactivity, authorised something to be done if he neither knew nor 
had reason to suspect that the act might be done. 
 
It is unnecessary, in this regard, that a respondent should know that a particular 
infringing act has occurred, providing that, from their awareness of the circumstances, 
he or she recognises that it is likely that such an act may occur.  In City of Adelaide v 
                                                 
48 Winstone v Wurlitzer Automatic Phonograph Co of Australia Pty ltd  [1946] VLR 338 (Herring CJ). 
49 (1975) 133 CLR 1. 
50 (1987) 10 IPR 349. 
51 (1988) 11 IPR 1.  To similar effect see Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v 
Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 25 IPR 1 at 4 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
52 RCA Corp v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1982] RPC 91.  
53 100 (Kearney J). 
54 (1990) 18 IPR 663. 
55 Ibid, at 667. 
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Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd,56 Knox CJ thought that it was 
sufficient for the purposes of ‘permission’ (which he equated with ‘authorisation’) if 
the defendant ‘knows or has reason to anticipate or suspect that the particular act is to 
be or is likely to be done’.  Isaacs J’s formulation in the same case (at 490-491) was a 
little wider than this, considering it sufficient if the defendant ‘knows or has reason to 
know or believe’ that the particular act of infringement ‘will or may’ be done.  In 
University of New South Wales v Moorhouse,57 Gibbs J summed up these 
requirements as follows: 
 
It seems to me … that a person who has under his control the means by which an 
infringement of copyright may be committed – such as a photocopying machine – and 
who makes it available to other persons, knowing, or having reason to suspect that it 
is likely to be used for the purpose of committing an infringement, and omitting to 
take reasonable steps to limit its use to legitimate purposes, would authorise any 
infringement that resulted from its use.58 
 
Obviously, where the invitation is ‘at large’, the inviter/authoriser may know nothing 
of the specific act of infringement that occurs, but can still be liable on the basis that 
he or she should have realised that it was likely that such an infringement might 
occur.  This point was made specifically by Jacob J in UNSW v Moorhouse where his 
Honour said:  
 
Where a general permission or invitation may be implied it is clearly unnecessary that 
the authorising party have knowledge that a particular act comprised in the copyright 
will be done (at p21). 
 
The acts and omissions of the alleged authorising party must be looked at in the 
circumstances in which the act comprised in the copyright is done.  The circumstances 
will include the likelihood that such an act will be done.  
 
‘(t)he Court may infer an authorisation or permission from acts which fall short of 
being direct and positive; ... indifference, exhibited by acts of commission or 
omission, may reach a degree from which authorisation or permission may be 
inferred.  It is a question of fact in each case what is the true inference to be drawn 
from the conduct of the person who is said to have authorised ...’ (per Bankes LJ in 
Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd (1924) 1 KB 1, at p 9 ) 
(at p21). 
 
A corollary to the above is that if a defendant realises that there is a likelihood that 
infringing acts will be committed, with the use of facilities or equipment that it has 
provided, and takes reasonable steps to avoid this happening, liability for 
authorisation should then be avoided. 
  
Until 2000, in Australia, these principles had been developed solely through the cases, 
but, in that year, the Copyright Act 1968 was amended (as part of the Copyright 
                                                 
56 (1928) 40 CLR 481 at 487. 
57 (1975) 133 CLR 1 at 13. 
58 To similar effect see also Mellor v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1940] AC 491 (PC); 
Winstone v Wurlitzer Automatic Phonograph Co of Australia Pty Ltd [1946] VLR 338. 
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(Digital Agenda) Amendment Act 2000) by the addition of s 36(1A), which now 
contains a list of the kinds of factors that ‘must be taken into account’ by a court in 
determining whether a person has authorised the doing in Australia of any act 
comprised in the copyright of a work, without the licence of the copyright owner.  
These are as follows: 
 
(a) the extent (if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of the act 
concerned; 
(b) the nature of any relationship existing between the person and the person who 
did the act concerned; 
(c) whether the person took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the doing of 
the act, including whether the person complied with any relevant industry 
codes of practice. 
 
It is suggested in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Digital Agenda Bill (para 57) 
that these essentially codify the principles that had been developed in the previous 
cases (in particular University of New South Wales v Moorhouse59), and were 
‘intended to provide a degree of legislative certainty about liability for authorising 
infringements’.  But this may be too broad a statement, particularly with respect to 
sub-para (a) and its reference to ‘if any’.  This suggests that liability for authorisation 
may arise, even where the authoriser has no power to prevent the infringement, for 
example, where he or she has deliberately put themselves in a position where they 
cannot intervene to prevent the infringement.  But the possession of power to prevent 
infringements is a temporal matter, and sub-para (c), with its reference to ‘reasonable 
steps’ seems to underline the point that a defendant will not escape liability if it was 
previously in a position to prevent the infringements and failed to take such steps.  It 
seems clear here that courts will look at the reality of the situation, and that a 
defendant will not avoid liability through reliance on, for example, a warranty in a 
contractual arrangement with another party that the latter will not engage in infringing 
activities.60  Furthermore, the significance of sub-para (b), with its reference to the 
‘nature of the relationship’ between the alleged authoriser and end user should not be 
overlooked.  In the classic vendor-purchaser situation, as in Amstrad and Hanimax, 
the relationship between the parties usually comes to an end post-sale.  In the online 
environment, however, where there is a provision of P2P software, the relationship 
may be a continuing one, with the provision of upgrades, help lines and the like.  
From the perspective of the supplier, the continuing relationship may be a 
commercially important one as well, for example, where the supplier depends upon 
advertising to support its activities and therefore wants to remain in contact with the 
end-user. 
 
With a particular view to online communications, the 2000 amendments also inserted 
a new s 39B, which seeks to limit the liability of persons  (including ‘carriers or 
carriage service providers’61) who provide facilities for making, or facilitating the 
making of, a communication’: such persons are not to be taken to have authorised any 
                                                 
59 (1975) 133 CLR 1. 
60 See eg Australasian Performing Right Association Limited v Metro on George Pty Limited [2004] 
FCA 1123 (31 August 2004), currently on appeal. 
61 These two terms are defined by reference to the definitions of these terms that appear in the 
Telecommunications Act 1997.  
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infringement of copyright in a work ‘merely because another person uses the facilities 
so provided to do something the right to do which is included in the copyright’.  (A 
similar provision applies under s 112E in relation to other subject matter, including 
sound recordings and films.)  The adverb ‘merely’ is important here, leaving it open 
that liability may arise where there is knowledge of infringing activities, coupled with 
a failure to take steps to prevent this occurring.  Until amendments passed late in 2004 
as part of the US Free Trade Agreement with Australia, the position of carriage 
service providers (‘CSPs’) remained precarious, so far as liability for authorisation 
was concerned, but there is now an elaborate array of provisions that provide ‘safe 
harbours’ for ISPs in particular circumstances depending upon knowledge, the taking 
of precautions, etc.62  These are analogous to the provisions found in section 512 of 
the US Copyright Act, but an examination of their operation lies outside the scope of 
the present article.63  
 
Joint tortfeasor liability 
 
Quite distinct from the liability for authorisation is the possibility of liability arising 
as a joint tortfeasor in the acts of infringement committed by another party.  In general 
terms, this would cover what is referred to in US law as ‘contributory infringement’, 
but it is likely that it is a more limited concept than in US law.  The activities covered 
by principles of joint tortfeasorship are aiding, abetting, facilitating and inducing the 
commission of infringing acts, but these activities must be underpinned by a ‘common 
design’ with the direct infringer, ie that both parties are engaged in some common 
enterprise or are acting ‘in concert’ in committing the tort’.64  Accordingly, in the case 
of patent infringement, supply of a product which is capable of both infringing and 
non-infringing uses will not of itself render the supplier liable for patent infringement 
merely because the person supplied uses the product so as to infringe; furthermore, 
supplying a product knowing that it will be used for the purpose of infringing a patent 
will not of itself give rise to liability as a joint tortfeasor.65  In the same way, 
advertising a product in such a way as to suggest that it can be used for infringing 
purposes will not be sufficient, in the absence of showing some common design 
between supplier and infringer to infringe.66  This suggests that, on the facts of 
Grokster, an Australian court would not impose liability on the basis of joint 
tortfeasorship, because it would be difficult to spell out any common design between 
the supplier of the software and the end-user who uses this for the purpose of 
downloading infringing reproductions (liability for authorisation, of course, is a 
different matter).  This distinction is nicely illustrated in a recent decision of 
Tamberlin J of the Federal Court, in which the respondent was sued for infringement 
                                                 
62 See now Division 2AA, Part V, Copyright Act 1968. 
63 For an analysis of the US ‘safe harbour’ provisions, see eg Goldstein, above n 7, para 8.3.2; J 
Ginsburg, ‘Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium”’ (1999) 23 Columbia Journal of Law & 
the Arts 137 at 160–64; D M Barker, ‘Defining the Contours of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: 
The Growing Body of Case Law Surrounding the DMCA’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 47 at 57–63. 
64 Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 169 CLR 574 at 580–581 (Brennan CJ, 
Dawson and Toohey JJ and Gummow J at 600); CBS Sony Ltd v Amstrad Plc [1988] 1 AC 1013 (HL) 
(Templeton L at 1057A–C, and 1055E–1057H). 
65 See Walker v Alemite Corporation (1933) 49 CLR 643 at 658 (Dixon J) cf s117 Patents Act 1990. 
66 See further WEA v Hanimax (1987) 10 IPR 349 and RCA v John Fairfax [1982] RPC 91. 
Ginsburg and Ricketson, ‘Inducers and Authorisers’ (2006) 11 Media & Arts Law Review 1 
 
 16
of copyright through the provision of links on his website which led customers to 
other websites from which infringing music files could then be downloaded.  On these 
facts, his Honour held that there was authorisation, in that the respondent could have 
taken steps to remove the offending links and had reason to suspect that infringing 
reproductions and communications would occur if this was not done.  On the other 
hand, there was no liability on the basis of joint tortfeasorship principles in that a 
common design between the respondents and his customers was not present.67   
 
Peer to peer in Australia: Universal Music v Sharman Networking 
 
The Federal Court of Australia gave its decision on 5 September 2005, following 
more than a year of evidence-gathering in defendant Sharman Networks’ computers.  
Perhaps learning its lesson from the ruling by the Dutch Supreme Court rejecting 
liability on the ground that Buma-Stemra (the performing and mechanical rights 
society of the Netherlands) had failed to demonstrate that KaZaa (which had been 
located in the Netherlands before its move to Sydney and Vanuatu) was able to 
control the infringing activities of its customers,68 the copyright owners obtained an 
‘Anton Piller order’69 authorising pre-trial discovery of Sharman’s computers.  For 
over a year, the right holders monitored every transaction and every email transiting 
through the Sharman servers.  This enabled them to establish an extensive record 
concerning both the measures that could be taken to control users, and Sharman’s 
apparent relinquishment of that control.  Even then, it should be noted that there were 
significant gaps in the evidence, for example, as to whether there was a central server 
in the KaZaa system. 
 
It was argued by the applicants that the statute did not require that the defendant in 
fact be able to prevent the infringement; the statutory language ‘(if any)’ that was 
used in s 36(1A)(a) suggested the possibility that the extent of the power might be 
nil.70  The court did not rule explicitly on this submission, but, by implication, did so 
in its emphasis on the third element in s 36(1A)(c), which focussed on the reasonable 
steps the defendant could have taken to avoid infringement.71  On that score, the 
record of the defendant’s calculated inactivity spoke starkly.  As the court 
summarised its findings: 
 
(i) despite the fact that the KaZaa website contains warnings against the sharing of 
copyright files, and an end user licence agreement under which users are made to agree 
                                                 
67 See generally Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper [2005] FCA 972 (14 July 2005); the facts 
here were similar to those in Universal City Studios Inc v Reimerdes 111 F Supp 2d 294 (SDNY, 
2000).  
68 Vereniging Buma, Stichting Stemra v KaZaa BV, Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad), 
decision of 19 December 2003, AN7253 Case no: C02/186HR.   
69 See Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2004] FCA 183 (4 March 
2004).  An ‘Anton Piller’ order is an ex parte order granted by a court that enables a potential plaintiff 
to enter premises and seize evidence when there are strong reasons to fear that the defendant may 
destroy or remove it.  Such orders are usually subject to strict conditions by the court and named after 
the original UK Chancery decision of Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55.  
70 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2004] FCA 183 (4 March 2004) 
at 360. 
71 Ibid, at 328, 330. 
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not to infringe copyright, it has long been obvious that those measures are ineffective to 
prevent, or even substantially to curtail, copyright infringements by users.  The 
respondents have long known that the KaZaa system is widely used for the sharing of 
copyright files; 
 
(ii) there are technical measures … that would enable the respondents to curtail – although 
probably not totally to prevent – the sharing of copyright files.  The respondents have 
not taken any action to implement those measures.  It would be against their financial 
interest to do so.  It is in the respondents’ financial interest to maximise, not to 
minimise, music file-sharing.  Advertising provides the bulk of the revenue earned by 
the KaZaa system, which revenue is shared between Sharman Networks and Altnet; 
 
(iii) far from taking steps that are likely effectively to curtail copyright file-sharing, 
Sharman Networks and Altnet have included on the KaZaa website exhortations to 
users to increase their file-sharing and a webpage headed ‘Join the Revolution’ that 
criticises record companies for opposing peer-to-peer file-sharing.  They also sponsored 
a ‘KaZaa Revolution’ campaign attacking the record companies.  The revolutionary 
material does not expressly advocate the sharing of copyright files.  However, to a 
young audience, and it seems that KaZaa users are predominantly young people, the 
effect of this webpage would be to encourage visitors to think it ‘cool’ to defy the 
record companies by ignoring copyright constraints.72 
 
The KaZaa decision’s resemblance to Grokster’s three-point analysis is striking.  Like 
the US Supreme Court, the Australian Federal Court addressed the defendant’s 
promotion of the infringement-facilitating features of its service to a ‘risky 
demographic’73 of likely infringers; defendant’s deliberate failure to filter out 
infringing content; and its infringement-dependent business plan.  The Federal Court 
also noted the colourable nature of such copyright-protective measures as KaZaa had 
taken (wink-and-nod website warnings not to commit infringement).  Unlike the US 
Supreme Court, however, the Federal Court had the advantage of extensive evidence, 
albeit much contested, as to the steps that the defendant could have taken to restrict 
infringing activities.  For both courts, however, the knowledge of the defendants as to 
the likelihood of infringements occurring – and the scale of these infringements – was 
clear: neither was an innovator ‘innocently’ developing a new technology which 
might inevitably spawn infringements in its wake.  Nonetheless, despite the 
similarities between the two decisions, the prospects of finding liability for enabling 
infringement may be greater in Australia than in the US, principally because there is 
no precedent in Australia equivalent to Sony: where UK and Australian courts have 
rejected ‘authorisation liability’ with respect to recording devices and media, this has 
been based on lack of control over the users’ acts, not on the non-infringing uses to 
which the recorders could be put.74  On the other hand, it should be noted that a ‘bad 
                                                 
72 Court’s summary; see also 184 (‘I do not doubt that some people use KaZaa only in a non-infringing 
way.  However, it seems unlikely that non-infringing uses would sustain the enormous KaZaa traffic 
claimed by the respondents.  The explanation of that volume of traffic must be a more populist use.’), 
403–15 (legal conclusions concerning ‘authorisation’). 
73 The phrase is borrowed from S Högberg, ‘Note, Doctrinal Problems in the Judicial Expansion of 
Secondary Copyright Liability’ (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review (forthcoming). 
74 See eg CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] 1 AC 1013 (HL) (multiple-
headed tape recorder); WEA International Inc v Hanimex Corporation Ltd (1987) 10 IPR 349 (blank 
tape); Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 176 CLR 
480 (HC Australia) (blank tape). 
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guy’ inducement theory of liability, absent some degree of control and/or lack of 
reasonable steps to prevent infringement, will not succeed in Australia on current 
theories of joint tortfeasor liability.  Thus, the KaZaa court rejected out of hand an 
extravagant claim by the applicant against the defendant on the ground of civil 
conspiracy, and it is also likely that any lesser claim based on procuring and 
facilitating end user infringements would have failed on the basis of lack of common 
design between Sharman and end users.75  
 
While KaZaa remains still a ‘work in progress’, with an appeal pending to the Full 
Federal Court in late February 2006 (and, perhaps, thereafter to the High Court), the 
decision of Wilcox J is notable for certain other features: 
 
1) The interventions of amicus curiae: this is not as common a feature in Australian 
litigation as it is in the US.  Australian amici must possess a degree of independence 
from the parties to the proceeding and must have further material or considerations 
that they are able to place before the court.76  At the same time, Wilcox J was eager to 
confine the case to the ‘true issue’, ie authorisation, noting that there were two matters 
that this was not a case about:   
 
First, many people (including the respondents) argue that the Internet is here to stay, it 
is being used by an ever increasing number of people and peer-to-peer file-sharing is 
one of its most valuable potential uses.  They say that copyright owners, such as the 
present applicants, could eliminate (or at least substantially reduce) infringement of 
their copyrights if they were willing to make copyright works available on a licensed 
basis for a fee, in the way in which Altnet offers gold files.  Second, it was suggested at 
one stage of this case that it would have been possible for the applicants to have made 
their compact discs less vulnerable to being ‘ripped’ into a computer program by 
issuing them in a digital rights managed, rather than open, format. 
 
Neither of these matters falls for decision in this case.  I understand the argument in 
favour of more widespread licensing of copyright works.  No doubt that course would 
have commercial implications for sound recording distributors.  Whether or not they 
should take it is a matter to be determined by them.  Unless and until they do decide to 
take that course, they are entitled to invoke such protective rights as the law affords 
them.  Similarly in regard to making compact discs less susceptible to ripping; 
although, in regard to that matter, I add the evidence is insufficient for me to reach any 
conclusion about the feasibility of doing this.77 
 
2) Despite attempts by the respondents to find refuge behind s 112E of the Copyright 
Act (see above), it was clear that the ‘something more’ than the mere provision of 
facilities required for the purposes of liability for authorisation was present.  On the 
other hand, the proposed orders of Wilcox J display a concern to strike a balance 
between what might be called the ‘legitimate concerns’ of the parties.  While the past 
conduct of the respondents might have shown a disregard for the rights of copyright 
                                                 
75 To the same effect, see Universal Music v Cooper [2005] FCA 972 (14 July 2005). 
76 His Honour gave leave here to representatives of the Australian Consumers Association Pty Ltd, 
Electronic Frontiers Australia Inc and the New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties Inc. 
77 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (with Corrigendum dated 22 
September 2005) [2005] FCA 1242 (5 September 2005) 
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owners, the technology being used by Sharman and Altnet was innovative and 
potentially of wider and more beneficial, ie non-infringing, applications, and his 
Honour was clearly concerned that his findings should not constitute a freeze on such 
activities.  These matters were clearly put to the court by the amici whose views could 
not be regarded as self-interested as those of the respondents.  Hence, the form of 
orders proposed by Wilcox J is of great interest.  After the appropriate declaratory and 
injunctive orders in relation to the infringing conduct, notably order 4, his Honour 
formulated the following order that envisages the continuation of the KaZaa system 
under certain circumstances:  
 
5 Continuation of the KaZaa Internet file-sharing system (including the provision of 
software programs to new users) shall not be regarded as a contravention of order 4 if 
that system is first modified pursuant to a protocol, to be agreed between the infringing 
respondents and the applicants, or to be approved by the Court, that ensures either of 
the following situations: 
 (i):  that: 
(a) the software program received by all new users of the KaZaa file-sharing system 
contains non-optional key word filter technology that excludes from the displayed 
blue file search results all works identified (by titles, composers’ or performers’ 
names or otherwise) in such lists of their copyright works as may be provided, and 
periodically updated, by any of the applicants; and  
(b) all future versions of the KaZaa file-sharing system contain the said non-optional 
key word filter technology; and 
(c) maximum pressure is placed on existing users, by the use of dialogue boxes on the 
KaZaa website, to upgrade their existing KaZaa software program to a new version 
of the program containing the said non-optional key word filter technology; or 
(ii) that the TopSearch component of the KaZaa system will provide, in answer to a 
request for a work identified in any such list, search results that are limited to 
licensed works and warnings against copyright infringement and that will exclude 
provision of a copy of any such identified work.78 
 
3) Later in his judgment, Wilcox J also made the point that copyright owners are not 
obliged, under existing law, to adopt self-protective measures and to minimise their 
losses.  This point arose particularly in relation to the effect to be given to s 112E of 
the Copyright Act, given his Honour’s finding that Sharman et al had done 
‘something more’ than simply providing facilities or means that could be used for 
copyright infringement by third parties: 
 
[418] I accept that Parliament intended to ‘protect the messenger’, although only to 
the extent indicated by the Act; notably s 112E.  However, on my findings, Sharman is 
and was more than a ‘messenger’.  Whether it is ‘unrealistic and unfair’ that a software 
provider in Sharman’s position should be held to have authorised copyright 
infringement by users of the software is a matter of opinion.  The Court must take 
guidance from the Act, as elucidated by relevant judicial decisions.  It is not for the 
Court to reject that guidance on the basis that the particular judge considers the result to 
be unrealistic and unfair.  If Parliament thinks that is, indeed, the result of applying the 
Act, the remedy is in its hands. 
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September 2005) [2005] FCA 1242 (5 September 2005), para 5. 
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[419] The available evidence does not permit me to reach any clear conclusion as to 
the steps that might have been available to the applicants directly to protect their 
copyright in works reproduced in CDs distributed by them.  The reason that evidence 
was not adduced, I surmise, is that all the respondents’ counsel realised it is not a 
defence to an action for copyright infringement for a respondent to point to failings in 
self-protection by the copyright owner.  Copyright law contains no equivalent of the 
doctrine of contributory negligence. If counsel is correct in asserting the applicants 
could have achieved some protection by adopting a DRM format, the applicants might 
do well to consider taking that course.  However, neither the assertion nor the 
applicants’ reaction to it can affect the legal issues now before the Court.79  
 
Liability under the International conventions for facilitation of 
infringement 
 
It is worth concluding this comparative study with a brief examination of the position 
under the international copyright conventions: do these provide any stipulations 
and/or guidance on the matter of liability for those who facilitate copyright 
infringements?  In this article we simply adumbrate these questions, leaving their 
fuller development to a future study. 
 
At first blush, the answer is ‘no’: issues of secondary or contributory liability have 
never figured explicitly in any of the international conventions that now bind 
countries such as the USA and Australia and there is no explicit treaty obligation that 
deals with these matters.  On the other hand, the language of the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works is suggestive, to an Australian reader, of 
an underlying doctrine of ‘authorisation’, in that each exclusive right is formulated as 
the right to ‘authorise’ the doing of certain acts, such as translation, reproduction, 
public performance, etc, and the same language appears in the WCT.  Such language 
can be traced back to the original Berne Act of 1886 where the translation right in 
article V was referred to as the ‘exclusive right of making or authorising’, and was 
replicated in later Acts as more exclusive rights came to be protected.  It is therefore 
likely that the convention language was the inspiration for the inclusion of 
‘authorisation’ in s 1(2) of the UK Copyright Act 1911 whence it travelled into the 
Australian Copyright Act 1968.  But nothing is to be found in the Berne convention 
materials to indicate what is meant by the word ‘authorise’ and whether it would 
extend to the activities of those who facilitate the carrying out of infringements of the 
kind in issue in Grokster and KaZaa.  On one reading, ‘authorise’ could extend even 
to the infringement-inducing activities of the vendors of machines and media which 
are then used for the making of infringing copies after the vendor has lost any control 
over the end user.  But the convention texts, and the supporting conference materials, 
are silent on this point, suggesting that such an extended form of liability was never in 
the minds of those formulating these treaty texts.  This may be because, at least until 
the 1967 Stockholm revision, the circumstances leading to an ‘authorisation’ would 
not likely have extended beyond an agency context (master-servant, or other hired 
party), to encompass the mass market provision of copying equipment.  The better 
view, therefore, must be that ‘authorise’ has a more limited connotation, and, at its 
                                                 
79 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (with Corrigendum dated 22 
September 2005) [2005] FCA 1242 (5 September 2005) 
Ginsburg and Ricketson, ‘Inducers and Authorisers’ (2006) 11 Media & Arts Law Review 1 
 
 21
most generous, as in Australian law, envisages some degree of control and continuing 
relationship between the ‘authoriser’ and the end user.  Beyond this, it is unlikely that 
the Berne and WCT directly support any additional obligation to impose liability on 
‘bad person’ inducers of the Grokster-KaZaa kind.  In this regard, it should also be 
noted that there are no specific contributory liability obligations in the related areas of 
patents and trade marks under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, although contributory infringers, particularly in the case of patent method 
claims, have always been problematic for patentees, and some national laws do 
provide for contributory liability.80 
 
On further inquiry, however, it is possible to derive from the international conventions 
an evolving obligation to protect against the kind of facilitation present in the 
Grokster and KaZaa cases.  For example, specific obligations to provide against 
contributory infringing activities in copyright may be deduced from the provisions of 
the Universal Copyright Convention, which continues to bind both Australia and the 
USA.  This instrument, now frequently overlooked, does not contain a series of 
specific provisions requiring protection of exclusive rights (as under Berne) but 
begins with a general obligation in Article I under which each Contracting State 
‘undertakes to provide for the adequate and effective protection of the rights of 
authors and other copyright proprietors in literary, scientific and artistic works’.  
Article IVbis of the Paris version of 1971 then provides that the rights referred to in 
Article I ‘shall include the basic rights ensuring the author’s economic interests, 
including the exclusive right to authorise reproduction by any means, public 
performance and broadcasting’.  The reference to ‘authorise’ here raises similar, and 
unresolved, issues of interpretation as under the Berne and WCT texts.  However, the 
reference to provision for the ‘adequate and effective protection of the rights of 
authors and copyright proprietors’ is suggestive that this might require appropriate 
contributory liability provisions to form part of national copyright laws.  There is 
nothing in the conference records or commentaries to this effect, but it is surely 
arguable, in the online environment, that ‘adequate and effective protection’ would 
require national laws to provide for liability in the case of intermediaries such as 
Grokster and KaZaa. 
 
By contrast, it may not be so easy to distil such an obligation in the terms of the 
TRIPS Agreement (which, incidentally, does not require compliance with the UCC), 
which deals with the matter of enforcement in great detail in Part III.  The very 
specificity of these provisions argues against any further obligation to impose liability 
upon facilitators and intermediaries: thus, the obligation in article 41 for contracting 
countries to ‘ensure that enforcement procedures as are specified in this Part are 
available … so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of 
intellectual property rights covered by this agreement’ indicates that the focus is to be 
on the remedies and procedures detailed in the following provisions rather than on the 
imposition of a further substantive liability on the part of facilitators and 
intermediaries. 
 
                                                 
80 See eg US Patent Act, 35 USC § 271(b); German Patent Law s 10(2); Ireland Patents Act s 41(2); 
Belgium Patent Law art 27-2. 
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Nonetheless, the WCT, and perhaps ultimately the Berne Convention, provide 
indications that the scope of the author’s rights can extend to rights against persons 
who knowingly or intentionally supply the means to infringe.  First, WCT article 11 
obliges member states to provide ‘adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies’ against ‘the circumvention’ of technological measures used by authors to 
protect their rights.  Although that instrument does not explicitly require member 
states to prohibit the provision of devices designed to circumvent technological 
measures, the leading commentators agree that protection would not be ‘adequate and 
effective’ unless the obligation extended beyond the act of circumvention to the 
devices designed or predominantly used to circumvent.81  National laws implementing 
the WCT have, moreover, prohibited the circulation of such devices.82  This suggests 
a recognition that the direction to national laws to ensure ‘adequate and effective’ 
coverage of technological protection measures includes the understanding that, in a 
digital environment in which end users are the direct infringers, and the commercial 
intermediaries may not themselves directly commit infringing acts, to confine the 
scope of protection to direct infringement may significantly short-change the 
copyright. 
 
To this point, the argument indicates that ‘adequate and effective’ provisos can and 
should be understood to encompass at least some forms of liability for facilitators, 
including those who provide end users with the means to infringe.  But where a treaty 
does not explicitly provide for ‘adequate and effective’ protection, does it follow that 
there can be no obligation to prohibit inducement or ‘authorisation’ (in the Anglo-
Australian sense)?  The structure of the Berne Convention suggests another basis for 
inferring a requirement that protection be ‘adequate and effective’ (and thus for 
obliging member states to extend liability beyond direct actors in certain 
circumstances).  The Berne Convention combines two fundamental approaches to 
international copyright: the rule of national treatment, and substantive minima of 
protection.83  With each revision, the Convention has added further rights or subject 
matter to the minimum substantive protections which all Union members must 
provide to authors from other Union members.  The minima have expanded as 
member states have come to agree on the necessity for effective protections in 
evolving commercial or technological marketplaces.  Arguably, the rule of national 
treatment should ensure appropriate protection, for one might assume that member 
states will provide their own authors with the necessary extent of coverage.  What, 
then, do substantive minima add?  For one thing, in the event that a member state does 
not adequately protect its own authors, Berne requires that the state at least provide 
the internationally-agreed level of protection to other Berne authors.  If Berne did not 
implicitly require that member states provide adequate and effective coverage, it 
would leave the level of coverage entirely to the member states.  That member states 
                                                 
81 See eg J Reinbothe and S von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996, Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 
London, 2002, p 145; M Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet: The 1996 WIPO Treaties, 
Their Interpretation and Implementation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p 549; S Ricketson 
and J C Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, para 15.17. 
82 See eg 17 USC sec 1201(a)(2), 1201(b); Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, Official Journal L 167, 22/06/2001 (the ‘Information Society Directive’) art 6. 
83 See generally Ricketson and Ginsburg, above n 81, chapter 6. 
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incur obligations over and above domestic norms suggests a Conventional intent that 
protection be real, not merely formal.  Second, the accumulation of minima has over 
time come to articulate a supranational code of copyright, albeit with gaps and 
ambiguities left to member state resolution.  For example, article 5(2) provides, ‘apart 
from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means 
of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by 
the laws of the country where protection is claimed’.  Thus, as to the coverage of 
subject matter and rights not specifically mandated by the Convention, the protecting 
country’s law will determine the existence and scope of protection and remedies 
available to the author.  Because the text prefaces this delegation to domestic law as 
‘apart from’ the substantive minima, it would follow that art 5(2) does not permit a 
member state to set the scope of protection for the minimum rights so narrowly as to 
defeat claims to effective protection.  The minimum rights relevant to P2P exchanges 
include, with respect to all Berne-protected works, the reproduction right (article 
9(2)); with respect to recorded musical works, the right of ‘any communication to the 
public’ (article 11(1)(ii)); and with respect to cinematographic works, the right of 




While always difficult to predict future developments, it is possible that facilitators of 
online infringements may now be more vulnerable in Australia than in the US.  In the 
US if bad intent is not shown (or not inferred from the scale of the enabled 
infringements) the prospect of non-infringing uses (albeit in still-undefined 
proportion) may relieve the technology entrepreneur of liability for contributory 
infringement.  This may be true even where the entrepreneur relinquishes the ability 
to control end user conduct, at least where that relinquishment is not probative of 
intent to induce.85   
 
After KaZaa, by contrast, an entrepreneur who deliberately foregoes control that it 
could have exercised had it designed its service differently may well be found to have 
authorised the ensuing infringements in violation of Australian law.  Whether the 
contrast is more theoretical than real may turn on whether there are bona fide reasons 
to decline to undertake measures to prevent or limit infringements.  If there are not, 
the entrepreneur is likely to be held an inducer in the US and an authoriser in 
Australia.  If there are, the Sony standard may protect the entrepreneur in the US; it is 
possible that an Australian court would require a more persuasive showing that the 
bona fide explanation in fact supplied the entrepreneur’s reasons for declining to 
avoid infringements. 
 
The possible difference in outcome poses some fascinating private international law 
consequences.  Copyright law is generally territorial: liability in a given state arises 
out of wrongful acts occurring or impacting in that state.  Unexcused copying in the 
                                                 
84 While there may be uncertainty as to whether a communication to the public within the meaning of 
the 1971 Berne text requires coverage of ‘pull’ as well as well as ‘push’ technologies, see Ricketson 
and Ginsburg, above n 81, paras 12.48–12.51, the right of ‘making available to the public’ set out at 
WCT art 8 clearly covers individual on-demand transmissions; see ibid, at paras 12.57–12.58. 
85 But see above n 34 (entrepreneur who does filter may be found to lack requisite bad intent). 
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US violates US copyright law, and unexcused copying in Australia violates Australian 
copyright law.  Unexcused communication to the US public violates US law, and 
unexcused communication to the Australian public violates Australian law.  But, 
unexcused communication from Australia to the public outside Australia also appears 
to violate Australian law.86  This suggests that a technology entrepreneur who makes 
it possible for Australians to communicate works to the public outside Australia 
without the right holders’ permission may be violating Australian law, even if the 
entrepreneur would not be liable under the law of the recipients’ countries.87  An even 
bolder forecast might be ventured: the Australian Act s 36(1A) establishes liability for 
authorising the ‘doing in Australia,’ but does not explicitly require that the 
authorising be done from Australia.  This could mean that a KaZaa-like operation 
located outside Australia, such as Grokster or Streamcast, might be found to 
‘authorise’ the communication to the public in Australia if Australian subscribers use 
the Grokster or Streamcast software to make works on their hard drives available to 
web surfers inside or outside Australia.  The communication to the public will have 
been done from Australia, and, by providing the software and updates, promoting the 
free copying features of the service, and planning their businesses to depend on 
attracting infringers, Grokster or Streamcast would have ‘authorised’ the Australian 
subscriber to engage in that communication.  Assuming personal jurisdiction could be 
obtained over the off-shore P2P providers (most likely on the basis of their 
commission of a tort in Australia), then Australia could become the litigation nerve 
centre for future P2P controversies wherever the providers may be located.88 
 
The US Grokster and Australian KaZaa decisions illustrate the adaptation of general 
principles to problems spawned by new technologies.  Even though KaZaa applies a 
statutory text, the reasoning draws on broader pre-statutory caselaw and seems largely 
consistent with the US Supreme Court’s federal common law analysis in Grokster.  
The two decisions may also have taken some of the wind out of the sails of proposals 
to substitute a P2P levy scheme for authors’ exclusive rights.89  At least to the extent 
those proposals were propelled by an énergie du désespoir at copyright’s apparent 
inability to confront the latest technological challenge, an effective compensation 
right seemed more appealing than a hollow exclusive right.  But if, as more recent 
decisions suggest, copyright can rein in the intermediaries who enable infringement 
                                                 
86 See Copyright Act 1968 s 10 (‘to the public means to the public within or outside Australia’). 
87 For extensive analysis of the international consequences of the KaZaa and Grokster analyses, see G 
W Austin, ‘Importing KaZaa – Exporting Grokster’ (2006) 22 Santa Clara Computer and High 
Technology Journal (forthcoming), available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=861224>. 
88 For further elaboration of this analysis, see ibid. 
89 For examples of these proposals, see eg W Fisher III, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the 
Future of Entertainment, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, chapter 6: ‘An Alternative 
Compensation System’; J Litman, ‘Sharing and Stealing’ (2004) 26 Hastings Communications and 
Entertainment Law Journal (COMM/ENT) 1; N W Netanel, ‘Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to 
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing’ (2003) 17 Harvard Law Journal & Technology 1.  Decisions 
subsequent to Grokster and Kazaa in other countries have also held against the facilitating 
intermediary.  See A Strowel, ‘Le P2P: un problème pressant en attente d’une réponse législative?’ 
(forthcoming) citing developments in Taiwan,   ‘Kuro Conviction Threatens P2P’, 10 September 2005, 
www.etaiwannews.com/Taiwan/Society/2005/09/10/1126320681.htm >; South Korea (Soribada), 
‘Prosecution Indicts Web Site Operators of Music Sharing’, 9 September 2005, 
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for their own profit, then the climate may prove conducive to licensing P2P 
exploitations.90  The goal, after all, is not to extirpate new modes of exploitation, but 
to bring them within the zone of exclusive rights, so that authors may avail 
themselves of technological advances for the benefit of both consumers and copyright 
owners. 
                                                 
90 Similarly, in the early US caselaw on derivative liability, the purpose of establishing the liability of 
the dance hall proprietors was not to prohibit them from hiring orchestras to perform music (the 
musicians being the direct infringers, who were not sued), but to oblige them to enter into public 
performance licenses with the performing rights society, ASCAP.   See eg Buck v Jewell-LaSalle 
Realty Co, 283 US 191 (1931); Dreamland Ballroom, Inc v Shapiro, Bernstein & Co, 36 F2d 354 (7th 
Cir 1929); Famous Music Corp v Bay State Harness Racing and Breeding Assn, 554 F 2d 1213 (1st Cir 
1977).  See also B Korman and I F Koenigsberg, ‘Performing Rights in Music and Performing Rights 
Societies’ (1986) 33 Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 332 at 348 (reviewing the 
‘development of the performing right in music and the operation of ASCAP, the oldest and largest 
performing rights society in the United States’). 
